![]() ![]() Second, sanctions are about to bite much harder. In the last 12 months he has broken both parts of that bargain, drafting large numbers of Russians to fight in Ukraine, and causing tough sanctions in response to his actions.īy using mobilised Russians as cannon fodder, and having emptied much of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund in 2022 to blunt damage to its economy, Putin has created dual pressures on Russian society.įirst, the demand for fresh recruits has become recurrent, mandatory and inexhaustible. ![]() His longevity has relied on the bargain he made with Russians: to protect them, and offer them stable lives with gradually improving living standards. Putin can’t endure unscathed by forever blaming the West, or purging his security services for his own bad choices. ![]() For its part, Russian society remains effectively apathetic – if no longer very enthusiastic – about the war. There’s no alternative value proposition for Russia’s political elites to remove Putin, and the personal risks for trying it remain very high. Of course, another Russian revolution (either from above or below) is still far off. To maintain social order he has become increasingly repressive, banning books, engaging in shadow conscription campaigns, and imprisoning many of those who speak out against the war.Īnd while the bitter infighting between the armed forces and paramilitary organisation the Wagner Group seems to have been settled for the moment, the fact that it was conducted so publicly suggests Putin no longer enjoys the same iron control amongst Russia’s leaders that he once did. With an estimated 80% of Russia’s entire ground forces now engaged in the conflict, plus tens of thousands of newly mobilised conscripts arriving at the front, there’s mounting pressure on those at the very top of Russia’s military leadership to achieve rapid results.įailing to achieve that will ultimately rebound on Putin. The recent spectacular failure of the Russian assault on Vuhledar in Ukraine’s south east, seen by many as the prelude to a Spring offensive, doesn’t bode well. Putin’s army – and his authority – in the spotlightĬonversely, for Russia to turn the tide it will have to dramatically reverse the abysmal performance of its armed forces. Second, Ukraine will require continued international aid and assistance to ensure its social order doesn’t break down as a result of economic collapse, and to be able to mitigate further damage to its critical infrastructure. But in the coming months, Kyiv will face two key challenges.įirst it will need to absorb Russian attacks while conducting its own offensive operations, which will require Western heavy armour, longer-range strike capabilities, and possibly air power. At present, Ukraine continues to have the upper hand, even if Russia’s armed forces have lately wrested back some momentum. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |